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Stochastic bandits robust to adversarial corruptions
Thodoris Lykouris∗ Vahab Mirrokni† Renato Paes Leme‡
Abstract
We introduce a new model of stochastic bandits with adversarial corruptions which aims to
capture settings where most of the input follows a stochastic pattern but some fraction of it can
be adversarially changed to trick the algorithm, e.g., click fraud, fake reviews and email spam.
The goal of this model is to encourage the design of bandit algorithms that (i) work well in
mixed adversarial and stochastic models, and (ii) whose performance deteriorates gracefully as
we move from fully stochastic to fully adversarial models.
In our model, the rewards for all arms are initially drawn from a distribution and are then
altered by an adaptive adversary. We provide a simple algorithm whose performance gracefully
degrades with the total corruption the adversary injected in the data, measured by the sum
across rounds of the biggest alteration the adversary made in the data in that round; this
total corruption is denoted by C. Our algorithm provides a guarantee that retains the optimal
guarantee (up to a logarithmic term) if the input is stochastic and whose performance degrades
linearly to the amount of corruption C, while crucially being agnostic to it. We also provide a
lower bound showing that this linear degradation is necessary if the algorithm achieves optimal
performance in the stochastic setting (the lower bound works even for a known amount of
corruption, a special case in which our algorithm achieves optimal performance without the
extra logarithm).
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1 Introduction
In online learning with bandit feedback, a learner needs to decide at each time between alternative
actions or arms of unknown quality, facing a trade-off between exploiting profitable past actions or
exploring new actions about which she has little information. Bandit problems are typically classified
according to how the rewards are generated. In stochastic bandits, rewards are drawn from fixed
but unknown distributions, which models settings where the alternatives follow particular patterns
and do not react to the learner. The other extreme is adversarial bandits, which are robust to
rewards that are specifically designed to trick the learner, as in game-theoretic settings.
In this paper, we focus on settings where the overall behavior is essentially stochastic but a small
fraction of the rewards can be adversarially changed. Classic stochastic bandit algorithms, like
Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) [ACBF02] or Active Arm Elimination (AAE) [EMM06], base most
of their decisions on a few observations made in an initial phase of the algorithm and therefore
can be easily tricked into incurring linear regret if very few arms are corrupted. Adversarial bandit
algorithms like EXP3 are not fooled by such tricks, but cannot exploit the fact that the input is
mostly stochastic.
Our goal is to robustify the stochastic setting by designing algorithms that can tolerate corruptions
and still be able to exploit the stochastic nature of the input. The algorithms we design are agnostic
to the corruption, i.e. they can tolerate any level of corruption, and the guarantee degrades gracefully
as more corruption is added. Moreover, we prove lower bounds showing that our results are tight up
to a logarithmic factor. Before we explain our technical contribution in detail, we describe examples
of settings we have in mind.
Click fraud In pay-per-click online advertising, the platform selects for each pageview an ad to
display and obtains a certain reward if the user clicks on the ad. The click probabilities are unknown.
The tension between repeatedly displaying a particular profitable ad that provides reliable revenue
and exploring other potentially more rewarding options is a major application of stochastic bandits
in the ads industry.
If it weren’t for a phenomenon known as click fraud, this would be a textbook example of stochastic
bandits. In click fraud, botnets maliciously simulate users clicking on an ad to trick learning
algorithms. One example is a bot consistently making searches to trigger some ad and not clicking
on it to make it seem like a certain ad has very low click-through-rate in order to boost its competitor.
Recommendation systems: A platform recommending activities or services to a user faces the
same trade-off. Suggesting new restaurants leads to faster learning of the best spots but may result to
dissatisfaction of the customers who are led to disappointing experiences. While most inputs follow
a stochastic pattern, some inputs are typically corrupted: either maliciously, e.g. fake reviews by
competitors, or non-maliciously, e.g. construction next-door makes the restaurant less desirable
in certain interval. This corruption may again exhibit arbitrary patterns and is not identically
distributed over time, yet it is dwarfed by the fact that most of the input is stochastic.
There are several other such examples: emails mostly follow a stochastic pattern except a fraction
of them which are spam and are designed to trick algorithms. Internet searches follow a predictable
pattern except certain spikes caused by unpredictable events. Data collection used in the economet-
ric process often suffers from errors that affect a small part of the input. In all those cases, the vast
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majority of the input follows a predictable pattern, but a fraction of the samples are corrupted.
1.1 Our contribution
Our model. In this paper, we introduce a new model of stochastic bandits with adversarial
corruptions. The goal of this model is to encourage the design of bandit algorithms that (i) work
well in mixed adversarial and stochastic models, and (ii) whose performance deteriorates gracefully
as we move from fully stochastic to fully adversarial models.
In this model there are K arms, each associated with a fixed reward distribution F(a). At each
round t, a random reward rtS(a) ∼ F(a) is drawn and an adversary can change the reward to rt(a),
possibly using information about the realizations of rτS(a) from both the current and previous rounds
τ ≤ t as well as the probability that the learner puts on each arm. The learner then draws an arm at
and obtains rt(at) both as reward and feedback. We say that the adversary is C-corrupted if in
every sample path we have
∑
tmaxa |rt(a)− rtS(a)| ≤ C.
Our results. The main result (Theorem 3 in Section 3) is a learning algorithm we term Multi-layer
Active Arm Elimination Race that with probability 1− δ has regret
O
∑
a6=a⋆
K · C log(KT/δ) + log(T )
∆(a)
· log(KT/δ)

where ∆(a) is the gap of arm a, i.e. the difference in stochastic means of arm a and the optimal
arm a⋆. For arms with very small gap, i.e. when ∆(a) ≤ 1/√T , the inverse dependence on the gap
can be replaced by
√
T . It is possible to improve the bound by a log factor for pseudo-regret, i.e.
maximum expected regret against any fixed arm, obtaining: O
(∑
a6=a∗
K·C+log(T )
∆(a) · log(KT )
)
. Two
important features of the algorithm are that the guarantee is:
• Agnostic: The algorithm does not need to know the corruption level C. The guarantee is
provided with respect to how much corruption was added in retrospect. If the corruption level
is known, we can remove the dependence on K · log(KT/δ) as shown in Theorem 1.
• High Probability: Our bounds hold with high probability which is important for practical
applications as the ones described above. In contrast, the weaker definition of pseudo-regret
often hides events with large regret that are offset by events with large negative regret.
The stochastic case corresponds to C = 0 in which case we recover a bound that is slightly worse
than the guarantee provided by UCB. Our algorithm obtains O
(∑
a6=a⋆ log(T ) · log(T/δ)/∆(a)
)
with
probability 1− δ, while UCB obtains this bound without the log(T ) term.
En route to the result, in Theorem 2 we show an algorithm that, for any fixed known C, provides
regret O
(∑
a6=a⋆
log(KT/δ)
∆(a)
)
for stochastic input andO
(
K · C ·∑a6=a⋆ (log(KT/δ))2∆(a) ) if it is C-corrupted.
In other words, if we only need to tolerate either a known level C or zero corruptions, we save a
logarithmic factor from the bound, and match the bound provided by UCB in the stochastic case.
Another question is whether the linear dependence on the corruption level is tight. In Section 4,
we show that it cannot be improved upon without decay in the stochastic guarantee (i.e. while still
guaranteeing logarithmic regret when the input is stochastic). The lower bound is an adaptation
from the adversarial to the corrupted setting of a result from Auer and Chiang [AC16]. This holds
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even for the case where the corruptions are either 0 or a known level C (where our algorithm provides
a matching upper bound). We prove in Theorem 4 that an algorithm with pseudo-regret O(log(T )/∆)
in the stochastic setting (C = 0) then for every constant ǫ > 0, there is a O(T ǫ)-corrupted instance
where the algorithm incurs regret Ω(T ǫ) with constant probability.
Our algorithm can also be viewed through the lens of the best of both worlds literature [BS12, SS14,
AC16, SL17], where the goal is to design algorithms that simultaneously provide logarithmic regret
guarantees in the stochastic regime and square-root guarantees in the adversarial. In Section 5, we
sketch how our algorithm can be appropriately modified to obtain, for any constant 0 < a < 1/2,
O˜(C) pseudo-regret for C = O(T a) and O˜(T a+1/2) pseudo-regret otherwise. We observe that the
results in the best of both worlds literature correspond to the case where a = 0. We note that such
bounds are obtained for pseudo-regret and not regret with high-probability.
Our techniques. The starting point of our design are classical stochastic bandit learning algorithms
like UCB and Active Arm Elimination. Such algorithms are very susceptible to corruptions since
they base most of their decisions on a small initial exploration phase. Therefore, with a small
number of corruptions it is possible to completely trick the algorithm into eliminating the optimal
arm.
We address this issue by robustifying them using a multi-layer approach. The learning algorithm
consists of multiple layers running in parallel. The layers have decreasing speed and increasing
tolerance to corruption. The first layer finishes very fast selecting an arm as optimal, but provides
no tolerance to corruption. Subsequent layers are more robust but also slower.
The resulting algorithm is a race between different layers for picking the optimal arm. Once the
fastest layer finishes, it provides a first crude estimate of the optimal arm. Once slower layers finish,
we obtain finer and finer estimates of the optimal arm.
Our second main idea is that we can obtain more robust algorithms by subsampling. If a layer is only
selected with probability p, it only receives in expectation a p-fraction of the corruption injected by
the adversary. If p is low enough, the layer behaves almost as if it was stochastic.
Finally, we couple the different layers together by a process of global eliminations. This process
enables slower layers to eliminate arms in faster layers. Such a process is necessary for preventing
inaccurate layers from pulling suboptimal arms too often.
1.2 Related work
Online learning with stochastic rewards goes back to the seminal work of Lai and Robbins [LR85].
The case of adversarial rewards was introduced by Auer et al. [ACBFS03]. The reader is referred
to the books of Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [CBL06], Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi [BCB12], and Slivkins
[Sli17] for an elaborate overview of the area. These two extremes suffer from orthogonal problems;
the one is overoptimistic expecting that all rewards come from the same distribution while the other
one is too pessimistic in order to be protected against malicious adversaries. Our work addresses
the middle ground: rewards come from distributions but are often adversarially corrupted. This is
motivated by the non-robustness of stochastic learning algorithms to even small corruption levels.
Closely related to our work lie the works on best of both worlds guarantees [BS12, SS14, AC16, SL17].
These works achieve (up to logarithmic factors) the optimal pseudo-regret guarantee for stochastic
rewards and the optimal pseudo-regret or actual regret guarantee for adversarial rewards. Bubeck
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and Slivkins [BS12] and Auer and Chiang [AC16] begin from a stochastic algorithm and test whether
they encounter non-stochastic behavior in which case they switch to adversarial algorithm. In
contrast, Seldin et al. [SS14, SL17] begin from an adversarial algorithm with very optimistic learning
rate and adapt it if they encounter such behavior. Recently and independently to this work, Wei
and Luo [WL18] provide a best of both worlds result with a small-loss pseudo-regret guarantee
on the adversarial setting, via a novel analysis of the log-barrier OMD algorithm of Foster et al.
[FLL+16]. Although the aforementioned algorithms are very elegant, their analysis is not robust to
inputs that are slightly away from stochastic. Our work bridges this gap by designing algorithms
with a more smooth behavior for close-to-stochastic instances.
There have been other works that attempt to provide improved guarantees than the adversarial
setting when instances are well behaved. Hazan and Kale [HK09] offer regret guarantees that scale
with the variance of the losses instead of the time horizon. This guarantee is meaningful in settings
that have a very predictable nature and have usually the same performance such as routing. However
they do not address most applications of stochastic bandits. In Click Fraud, for example the rewards
come from Bernoulli distributions and the variance of such a distribution is high even if the input is
totally stochastic. Another approach is the work of Shamir and Szlak [SS17], who consider an input
that is adversarial but random local permutations are applied to obtain a more benign instance.
This approach is very relevant in settings like buffering, but is again not applicable to our settings.
On the opposite side, attempting to provide improved guarantees for the stochastic setting or
enhancing their range is a very active area of research. For instance, the MOSS algorithm [AB09]
of Audibert and Bubeck provides the optimal non-distribution-based upper bound for stochastic
bandits while retaining the optimal distribution-based stochastic guarantee. The KL-UCB algorithm
of Garivier and Cappé [GC11] provides improved constants in the upper bound of the stochastic
guarantee matching the lower bound of Lai and Robbins [LR85] for Bernoulli rewards. The Robust
UCB algorithm [BCBL13] extends the results to non-bounded rewards replacing with the weaker
assumption of bounded variance. However, all the above results are not robust to corruptions from
an adaptive adversary due to their deterministic nature. Since the adversary knows the arm the
learner will select, they can always corrupt the optimal arm whenever it is about to be selected and
therefore cause the learner to either play it multiple times even if it is suboptimal or decide against
playing it even with a small amount of corruption (similarly as in our lower bound).
There is also prior work on incorporating corruptions in online decision making. In the online
learning front, there are two such attempts, to the best of our knowledge. In their best of both
worlds result, Seldin and Slivkins [SS14] allow for some contamination in the data as long as they
are obliviously selected and they do not decrease the gap by more than a factor of 2. The second
work is a recent paper by Gajane et al. [GUK18] who suggest a model of corrupted feedback aiming
for differential privacy. Unlike our model, their corruptions are neither adversarial nor adaptive.
Both of these works make benign assumptions about the nature of corruption and do not address
the main roadblock in the settings we consider: an adversarial saboteur will try to add faulty
data in the beginning to change the order between the two arms and, with a minimal corruption,
she will achieve this goal. Closer to our model are the works on robust allocation such as online
matching with corrupted data [MGZ12, EKM15]; unlike online matching though, in online learning
we cannot evaluate the optimum at every round since the algorithm’s decisions affect the information
it observes.
Last, learning in the presence of corruptions has recently received great attention in the batch
learning setting. For instance, recent works study inference under the presence of adversarially
corrupted data [MRT15], designing estimators that are robust to corrupted data [DKK+16], learn-
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ing in auctions with some faulty data due to econometrics errors [CD17]. Our work suggests a
similar framework for the study of online learning that is robust to adversarial corruptions in the
more challenging problem of sequential decision making where decisions also affect the information
observed.
2 Model
Corrupted stochastic bandits. We study an online bandit learning setting with K arms. Each
arm a ∈ [K] is associated with a distribution F(a) with mean µ(a). The distributions are assumed
to have positive measure only on rewards in [0, 1] and are unknown to the learner. We refer to the
optimal arm as a⋆ = argmaxa µ(a) and define ∆(a) = µ(a⋆)− µ(a).1
We consider an adversary who can corrupt some of the stochastic rewards. The adversary is adaptive,
in the sense that the corrupted rewards can be a function of the realization of the stochastic rewards
up to that point and of the learner’s choices in previous rounds. More formally, the protocol between
learner and adversary, at each round t = 1 . . . T , is as follows:
1. The learner picks a distribution wt over the K arms.
2. Stochastic rewards are drawn for each arm: rtS(a) ∼ F(a).
3. The adversary observes the realizations of rtS(a) as well as rewards and choices of the learner
in previous steps and returns a corrupted reward rt(a)∈ [0, 1].
4. The learner draws arm at ∼ wt and observes rt(at).
We refer to maxa|rt(a) − rtS(a)| as the amount of corruption injected in round t. The instance is
C-corrupted if the total injected corruption is at most C for all realizations of the random variables:∑
t
max
a
|rt(a)− rtS(a)| ≤ C
Note that the adversary is assumed to be adaptive, in the sense that she has access to all the
realizations of random variables for all rounds τ < t and the realization of rewards at round t but
only knows the player’s distribution at round t and not the arm at. Our guarantees gracefully
degrades with the total corruption injected by the adversary.
Regret notions. Regret corresponds to the difference between the reward obtained by the algo-
rithm and the reward of the best arm in hindsight:
Reg = max
a
∑
t
rt(a)− rt(at)
The regret is a random variable that depends on the random rewards, the randomness used by
the learner, and the randomness of the adversary. We say that a regret bound R(T, δ) holds with
probability 1− δ if
P[Reg < R(T, δ)] > 1− δ
where the probability is taken over all the three sources of randomness described.
1We note that a⋆ is one arm with optimal mean and this does not preclude the existence of other arms with the
same mean. If more than one such arms exist, let a⋆ be an arbitrary arm with optimal mean and the other arms
a 6= a⋆ with optimal mean have gap ∆(a) = 0.
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Finally pseudo-regret is a weaker notion that compares the expected performance of the learner
with the arm with the highest expected performance. In other words:
PseudoReg = max
a
E
[∑
t
rt(a)− rt(at)]
We note that by Jensen’s inequality, PseudoReg ≤ E[Reg]. We often obtain improved bounds for
pseudo-regret since it allows us to offset large positive regret events with large negative regret
events.
3 The upper bound: Multi-layer Active Arm Elimination Race
Active arm elimination. The starting point of our design is the Active Arm Elimination algorithm
for stochastic bandits [EMM06], which can be viewed as an alternative presentation of the more
famous UCB algorithm [ACBF02]. It is based on the following idea: in an initial exploration phase,
we pull arms in a round-robin fashion and compute an estimate µ˜(a) as the average empirical reward
of arm a. After n(a) pulls of arm a, usual concentration arguments establish that with probability at
least 1− 1/TΩ(1), the difference of the empirical and actual means is at most wd(a) = O(√log(T )/n(a)).
We say that [µ˜(a)− wd(a), µ˜(a) + wd(a)] is the confidence interval of arm a.
This means in particular that given two arms a and a′, if the difference in empirical means becomes
larger than the widths of the confidence intervals, i.e., µ˜(a) − µ˜(a′) > wd(a) + wd(a′), then with
high probability arm a′ is not optimal. Once this happens, the algorithm eliminates arm a′ by
removing it from the round-robin rotation. After both arms a and the optimal arm a⋆ are pulled
O(log(T )/∆(a)2) times, the confidence intervals will be small enough that arm a will be eliminated.
Eventually all arms but the optimal are eliminated and we enter what is called the exploitation
phase. In this phase we only pull the arm with optimal mean. Before we enter exploitation we
pulled each suboptimal arm a at most O(log(T )/∆(a)2) times. Each of those suboptimal pulls incurs
regret ∆(a) in expectation which leads to the pseudo-regret bound of O(∑a6=a⋆ log(T )/∆(a)). This
bound can also be converted to a high probability bound if we replace log(T ) by log(T/δ).
Arms with small ∆(a). We note that, for the arms that have ∆(a) < 1/
√
T , the inverse dependence
on the gap may initially seem vacuous; for instance, when there are two optimal arms a, a⋆ with
the same mean, the upper bound becomes infinite as ∆(a) = 0. However, the inverse dependence
on the gap can be replaced by ∆(a) · T in the case of pseudo-regret and √T in the case of actual
regret (due to variance reasons). For simplicity of exposition, we omit this in the current section
but we demonstrate how to perform this replacement in Section 5.
3.1 Enlarged confidence intervals
The active arm elimination algorithm is clearly not robust to corruption since by corrupting the
first O(log T ) steps, the adversary can cause the algorithm to eliminate the optimal arm. As the
algorithm never pulls the suboptimal arms after exploration, it is not able to ever recover. One
initial idea to fix this problem is to enlarge the confidence intervals. We can decompose the rewards
rt(a) in two terms rtS(a) + c
t(a) where the first term comes from the stochastic reward and the
second is the corruption introduced by the adversary. If the total corruption introduced by the
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adversary is at most C, then with width wd(a) = O(√log(T )/n(a) + C/n(a)), a similar analysis to
above gives us the following regret bound:
Theorem 1. If C is a valid upper bound for the total corruption then active arm elimination with
wd(a) =
√
log(2KT/δ)
n(a) +
C
n(a) has regret O
(∑
a6=a⋆
(
log(KT/δ)+C
∆(a)
))
with probability 1− δ.
Proof sketch. The proof follows the standard analysis of active arm elimination. We first estab-
lish that, with high probability the optimal arm a⋆ is never inactivated (Lemma 3.1) and then
upper bound the number of times each suboptimal arm is played (Lemma 3.2). The pseudo-regret
guarantee directly follows by multiplying the number of plays for each arm by its gap ∆(a). For
the high-probability guarantee, we need to also show that the regret incurred in the meantime
is not much more than the above. We provide proof details about the theorem and lemmas in
Appendix A.
Lemma 3.1. With probability at least 1− δ, arm a⋆ never becomes inactivated.
Lemma 3.2. With probability at least 1 − δ, all arms a 6= a⋆ become inactivated after N(a) =
36 log(2KT/δ)+6C
∆(a)2
plays.
3.2 Stochastic bandits robust to known corruption
The drawback of the active arm elimination algorithm with enlarged confidence intervals (Theorem 1)
is that, even if there are no corruptions, it still incurs a regret proportional to C. As a warm up to
the main theorem, we provide an algorithm that achieves the usual bound of O
(∑
a6=a⋆
log (KT/δ)
∆(a)
)
if the input is purely stochastic and, at the same time, achieves O
(
K · C ·∑a6=a⋆ log(KT/δ)2∆(a) ) if the
input is C-corrupted for a known C. In the next subsection, we modify the algorithm to make it
agnostic to the corruption level C.
Two instances of Active Arm Elimination. The first idea is to run two instances of active arm
elimination: the first is supposed to select the correct arm if there is no corruption and the second
is supposed to select the right arm if there is C corruption. The first instance is very fast but it is
not robust to corruptions. The second instance is slower but more precise, in the sense that it can
tolerate corruptions. Since the second instance is more trustworthy, if the second instance decides
to eliminate a certain arm a, we eliminate the same arm in the faster instance.
Decrease corruption by sub-sampling. To keep the regret low if the input is stochastic, the
second instance of active arm elimination cannot pull a suboptimal arm too many times. Therefore,
the technique in Theorem 1 alone is not enough. The main idea of the algorithm is to make arm a
behave as if it was almost stochastic by running the second instance with low probability. If the
learner selects to run the second instance with probability 1/C then, when the adversary adds a
certain amount of corruption to a certain round, the second instance observes that corruption with
probability 1/C. Therefore, the expected amount of corruption the learner observes in the second
instance is constant. This makes the arms behave almost like stochastic arms in that instance.
Learning algorithm. We obtain our algorithm by combining those ideas. We have two instances
of active arm elimination which we denote by F (fast) and S (slow). Each instance keeps an
estimate of the mean µ˜F(a) and µ˜S(a) corresponding to the average empirical reward of that arm
and also keeps track of how many times each arm was pulled in that instance nF(a) and nS(a). This
allows us to define a notion of confidence interval in each of the instances. We define wdF(a) =
O(√log(T )/nF(a)) as usual and for the slow instance we define slighly larger confidence intervals:
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S(a) = O(√log(T )/nS(a) + log(T )/nS(a)) (the reason will be clear in a moment). Also, each instance
keeps a set of eliminated arms for that instance: IF and IS.
In each round, with probability 1 − 1/C we make a move in the fast instance: we choose the next
active arm a in the round robin order, i.e., arm a ∈ [K] \ IF which was played less often, pull this
arm and increase nF(a) and update µ˜F(a) accordingly. As usual, if there are two active arms a and
a′ such that µ˜F(a)− µ˜F(a′) > wdF(a) + wdF (a′) we eliminate a′ by adding it to IF.
With the remaining probability we make a move in the slow instance by executing the exact same
procedure as described for the other instance. There is only one difference (which causes the two
instances to be coupled): when we inactivate an arm a in S we also eliminate it in F. This leaves us
with a potential problem: it is possible that all arms in the F instance end up being eliminated. If
we reach that point, we play an arbitrary active arm of the slow instance, i.e., any arm a ∈ [K] \IS.
The resulting algorithm is formally provided in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Fast-Slow Active Arm Elimination Race for known corruption C
1: Initialize nℓ(a) = 0, µ˜ℓ(a) = 0, Iℓ = ∅ for all a ∈ [K] and ℓ ∈ {F,S}
2: For Rounds t = 1..T
3: Sample algorithm ℓ: ℓ = S with probability 1/C. Else ℓ = F.
4: If [K] \ Iℓ 6= ∅
5: Play arm at ← argmina∈[K]\Iℓ nℓ(a)
6: Update µ˜ℓ(at)← [nℓ(a)µ˜ℓ(at) + rt(at)]/[nℓ(a) + 1] and nℓ(a)← nℓ(a) + 1
7: While exists arms a, a′ ∈ [K] \ Iℓ with µ˜ℓ(a)− µ˜ℓ(a′) > wdℓ(a) + wdℓ(a′)
8: Eliminate a′ by adding it to Iℓ
9: If ℓ = S then eliminate a′ from the other algorithm by adding it to IF
10: Else
11: Play an arbitrary arm in the set [K] \ IS.
Towards the performance guarantee, Lemma 3.3 bounds the amount of corruption that actually
enters the slow active arm elimination algorithm, which enables the regret guarantee in Theorem 2.
Lemma 3.3. In Algorithm 1, the slow active arm elimination algorithm S observes, with probability
at least 1 − δ, corruption of at most ln(1/δ) + 3 during its exploration phase (when picked with
probability 1/C).
Proof sketch. If one cared just about the expected corruption that affects S, this is at most a constant
number since the total corruption is at most C and it affects S with probability 1/C. To prove a
high-probability guarantee we require a concentration inequality on martingale differences (since
the corruptions can be adaptively selected by the adversary). We provide the details in Appendix
B.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 run with widths wdS(a) =
√
log(8KT/δ)
nS(a)
+ 2 log(
8KT/δ)
nS(a)
and wdF(a) =√
log(8KT/δ)
nF(a)
has O
(∑
a6=a⋆
log(KT/δ)
∆(a)
)
for the stochastic case and O
(
K · C ·∑a6=a⋆ (log(KT/δ))2∆(a) ) for
the C-corrupted case with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof sketch. The result for the stochastic case follows standard arguments for stochastic algorithms
(since we obtain double the regret of this setting as we run two such algorithms with essentially
the same confidence intervals). For the C-corrupted case, we establish via Lemma 3.3 an upper
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bound on the corruption that will affect the slow active arm elimination algorithm S. Thanks to
the sub-sampling, this upper bound is close to a constant instead of depending on C which allows
to not incur dependence on C in the stochastic case. Having this upper bound, we can apply it to
the algorithm of the previous section to get an upper bound on the number of plays of suboptimal
arms in S. Since the algorithms are coupled, such a bound implies an upper bound on the regret
that it can cause in F as well. This is because in expectation the arm is played at most K ·C times
more in F as it may be selected every single time in F prior to getting eliminated by S and F is
selected C times more often than S. To obtain the above guarantee with high probability, we lose
an extra logarithmic factor. The details of the proof are provided in Appendix B.
3.3 Stochastic bandits robust to agnostic corruption
Multiple layers of active arm elimination. In the previous subsection we designed an algorithm
with two layers: one is faster but cannot tolerate corruptions and the second one is slower but more
robust. In order to be agnostic to corruption, we need to plan for all possible amounts of corruption.
To achieve this, we introduce log(T ) layers. Each layer is slower but more robust than the previous
one. We achieve that by selecting the ℓ-th layer with probability proportional to 2−ℓ. By the
argument in the last section, if the corruption level is at most C, then each layer with ℓ ≥ logC
will observe O(1) corruption in expectation and at most O(log T ) corruption with high probability.
Global eliminations. We couple the log T instances through what we call global eliminations. If
arm a is eliminated by the ℓ-th layer, then we eliminate a in all layers ℓ′ ≤ ℓ. This is important to
prevent us from pulling arm a too often. If arm a is suboptimal and the adversary is C-corrupted,
then arm a eventually becomes eliminated in the ℓ⋆ = ⌈logC⌉ layer after being pulled O˜(1/∆(a)2) in
that layer. Since layer ℓ⋆ is played with probability 2−ℓ⋆ then it takes O˜(C/∆(a)2) iterations until
arm is eliminated globally, in which case we will have total regret at most O˜(C/∆(a)) from that arm.
Multi-layer active arm elimination race. We now describe our main algorithm in the paper.
We call it a race since we view it as multiple layers racing to pick the optimal arm. The less robust
layers are faster so they arrive first and we keep choosing (mostly) according to them until more
robust but slower layers finish and correct or confirm the current selection of the best arm.
The algorithm keeps ℓ = 1 . . . log(T ) different instances of active arm elimination. The ℓ-th instance
has as state the empirical means of each arm µ˜ℓ(a), the number nℓ(a) of times each arm a was
pulled and the set Iℓ of inactive arms. The width of the confidence interval for arm a in the ℓ-th
layer is implicitly defined as wdℓ(a) = O(√log(T )/nℓ(a) + log(T )/nℓ(a)).
In each round t we sample ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , log T} with probability 2−ℓ (with remaining probability we
pick layer 1). When layer ℓ is selected, we make a move in the active arm elimination instance
corresponding to that layer: we sample the active arm in that layer with the least number of pulls,
i.e., arm a ∈ [K] \ Iℓ minimizing nℓ(a). In case [K] \ Iℓ is empty, we pull an arbitrary arm from
[K] \ Iℓ′ for the lowest ℓ′ such that [K] \ Iℓ′ is non-empty.
The way we couple different layers is that once arm a′ is eliminated in layer ℓ because there is
another active arm a in layer ℓ such that µ˜ℓ(a) − µ˜ℓ(a′) < wdℓ(a) + wdℓ(a′) we eliminate arm a′ in
all previous layers, keeping the invariant that: I1 ⊇ I2 ⊇ I3 ⊇ . . ..
Figure 1 provides an example of the state of the algorithm, which is formally defined in Algorithm
2.
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µ˜1(1), n1(1) . . .µ˜1(2), n1(2) µ˜1(d), n1(d)
arm 1 arm 2 arm d. . .
ℓ = 1
µ˜2(1), n2(1) . . .µ˜2(2), n2(2) µ˜2(d), n2(d)ℓ = 2
µ˜3(1), n3(1) . . .µ˜3(2), n3(2) µ˜3(d), n3(d)ℓ = 3
µ˜lgT (1), nlg T (1) . . .µ˜lgT (2), nlg T (2) µ˜lgT (d), nlg T (d)ℓ = lg T
...
...
...
...
Figure 1: Example of the state of the algorithm: for each layer ℓ and arm a we keep the estimated
mean µ˜ℓ(a) and the number of pulls nℓ(a). Red cells indicate arms that have been eliminated in
that layer. If an arm is eliminated in a layer, it is eliminated in all previous layers. If a layer where
all the arms are eliminated (like layer 1 in the figure) is selected, we play an arbitrary active arm
with the lowest layer that contains active arms.
Algorithm 2 Multi-layer Active Arm Elimination Race
1: Initialize nℓ(a) = 0, µ˜ℓ(a) = 0, Iℓ = ∅ for all a ∈ [K] and ℓ ∈ [log T ]
2: For Rounds t = 1..T
3: Sample layer ℓ ∈ [log T ] with probability 2−ℓ. With remaining prob, sample ℓ = 1
4: If [K] \ Iℓ 6= ∅
5: Play arm at ← argmina∈[K]\Iℓ nℓ(a)
6: Update µ˜ℓ(at)← [nℓ(a)µ˜ℓ(at) + rt(at)]/[nℓ(a) + 1] and nℓ(a)← nℓ(a) + 1
7: While exists arms a, a′ ∈ [K] \ Iℓ with µ˜ℓ(a)− µ˜ℓ(a′) > wdℓ(a) + wdℓ(a′)
8: Eliminate a′ by adding it to Iℓ′ for all ℓ′ ≤ ℓ
9: Else
10: Find minimum ℓ′ such that [K] \ Iℓ′ 6= ∅ and play an arbitrary arm in that set.
We now provide the main result of the paper, a regret guarantee for Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 2 which is agnostic to the coruption level C, when run with widths wdℓ(a) =√
log(4KT ·log T/δ)
nℓ(a)
+ log(
4KT ·log T/δ)
nℓ(a)
has regret:
O
∑
a6=a∗
K · C log(KT/δ) + log(T )
∆(a)
· log(KT/δ)
.
Proof sketch. Similarly to the previous theorem, the regret guarantee comes from the summation
between layers that are essentially stochastic (where the corruption is below their corruption level,
i.e. less than C ≤ 2r for layer r). From each of these layers, we incur O
(
log(KT/δ)
∆(a)
)
regret. Since
there are at most log(T ) such layers, the second term in the theorem is derived. The challenge
is to bound the regret incurred by layers that are not robust to the corruption. However, there
exists some layer ℓ⋆ that is above the corruption level. By bounding the amount of steps that this
level will require in order to inactivate each arm a 6= a⋆ in the incorrect layers (via Lemma 3.2),
we obtain similarly to Theorem 2 a bound on the regret caused by this arm in those layers. Since
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we take the minimum such layer and the tolerance of layers is within powers of 2, the fact that its
corruption level does not match exactly the corruption that occurred only costs an extra factor of
2 in the regret. The details of the proof are provided in Appendix C.
4 The lower bound
For the two arms case where the gap between the arms is ∆ > 0, Theorem 2 presents an algo-
rithm which achieves O(log T/∆) pseudo-regret if the input is stochastic and O(C log(T/δ)/∆) with
probability 1− δ if the input is at most C-corrupted. We show below that this dependence is tight.
The lower bound (Theorem 4) adapts the technique of Auer and Chiang [AC16] from the adversarial
to the corrupted setting. The main idea is that an algorithm with logarithmic regret in the stochastic
setting cannot query the sub-optimal arm more than log(T )/∆2 times. This implies a long time period
where the learner queries the input only constant number of times. By corrupting all rounds before
this period, an adversary can make the optimal arm look sub-optimal and trick the learner into
not pulling the optimal arm for long time, causing large regret. Theorem 5 adapts this argument
bounding the expected positive regret E[Reg+] where x+ = max{x, 0}; the high probability bounds
provided imply bounds on the expected positive regret. Both proofs are provided in Appendix D.
Theorem 4. Consider a multi-armed bandits algorithm that has the property that for any stochastic
input in the two arm setting, it has pseudo-regret bounded by c log(T )/∆, where ∆ = |µ1 − µ2|.
For any ǫ, ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1), there is a corruption level C with T ǫ < C < T ǫ′ and a C-corrupted instance
such that with constant probability the regret is Ω(C).
Theorem 5. If a multi-armed bandits algorithm that has the property that for any stochastic
input in the two arm setting, it has pseudo-regret bounded by c log1+α(T )/∆ for α < 1. For any
ǫ, ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1), there is a corruption level C with T ǫ < C < T ǫ′ and a C-corrupted instance such that
E[Reg+] = Ω(T ǫ−δ) for all δ > 0.
5 Extensions
In this section, we discuss some extensions that our algorithm can accommodate.
Definition of corruption. We presented all results measuring the corruption as the sum over all
rounds of the maximum across arms of the corruption injected by the adversary:∑
t
max
a
|rt(a)− rtS(a) ≤ C.
In fact all our results can be improved via using C(a) =
∑
t |rt(a) − rtS(a)| and replacing C by
max(C(a), C(a⋆)) for summand a. More formally, our main theorem (Theorem 3) becomes:
Theorem 6. Algorithm 2 which is agnostic to the corruptions C(a) =
∑
t |rt(a)− rtS(a)|, when run
with widths wdℓ(a) =
√
log(4KT ·log T/δ)
nℓ(a)
+ log(
4KT ·log T/δ)
nℓ(a)
has regret:
O
∑
a6=a∗
K ·max(C(a⋆), C(a)) · log(KT/δ) + log(T )
∆(a)
· log(KT/δ)
.
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The proof follows the same arguments since it only compares each arm a with a⋆. This result is nice
since the contribution of each arm to the regret is a function only of its own gap and the corruption
injected to it and the one injected to arm a⋆. The latter dependence on the corruption on the
optimal arm is essential since the main attack we presented to the classical arguments only corrupts
arm a⋆ – the lower bound of the previous section also only adds corruption to a⋆.
Dependence on the gap. In Section 3, all our guarantees have an inverse dependence on the
gap ∆(a) of all arms a. Note that such a guarantee is completely meaningless for arms with a very
small gap; for instance, if there exist two optimal arms then there is an arm a 6= a⋆ with ∆(a) = 0
which makes the presented bound infinite and therefore vacuous. As we hinted there though, this
inverse dependence can be improved for arms with small ∆(a) ≤ 1/√T . Our proofs generally relied
on setting an upper bound on the number of times that a suboptimal arm is played and thereby
providing an upper bound on the regret they cause.
For arms with ∆(a) ≤ 1/√T , an alternative analysis is to say that, even if they are erroneously
selected every single time, we can upper bound the loss in performance they cause. For pseudo-
regret, the performance loss if they were selected every single time is ∆(a) ·T ≤ √T ≤ log T/∆(a). For
actual regret, one needs to also take into consideration the variance but, even if they are selected
every single time, a Hoeffding bound shows that their total reward is with high probability at most√
T lower than its expectation. As a result, the inverse dependence on ∆(a) in our bound can be
replaced by min(∆(a) · T, 1/∆(a)) for pseudo-regret and min(√T , 1/∆(a)) for actual regret.
Moreover, the careful reader may have noticed that in Theorem 1, the dependence C∆(a) can be
replaced by a sole dependence on C without the gap. However, this does not extend to the sub-
sequent theorems since the dependence on C there does not come from the upper bound on the
corruption experienced (this is at most log T due to subsampling). Instead, the dependence on C
comes from projecting the correct layer (smallest layer robust to corruption) to the previous layers
via the number of times it will take to eliminate any suboptimal arm.
Uncorrupted objective. In applications such as spam, the corruptions should not be counted as
part of the rewards. Our algorithm provides the same guarantee in the case of uncorrupted rewards
(the difference between the performances in the two objectives is at most C). One can also observe
that the linear dependence on C is still necessary: consider 2 arms with ∆ = 1 and an adversary
that corrupts the first C steps making them look identical. The learner has no better option than
randomly selecting between the two which gives him a regret of C/2 under the uncorrupted objective.
We note that, in this setting, the linear dependence is necessary unconditionally of the performance
of the algorithm in the stochastic setting.
Towards best of all worlds. In the previous section, we showed that a logarithmic dependence
in the stochastic setting comes at the expense of linear dependence on C in the C-corrupted setting
if we focus on actual regret. A very interesting direction is to achieve such an improvement with
either a higher power on the logarithm in the stochastic setting or aiming for pseudo-regret instead.
In fact, we can combine our algorithm with the SAPO algorithm of Auer and Chiang [AC16] and
achieve a bicriteria guarantee for pseudo-regret. For an a < 1/2 specified by the algorithm, we
achieve our guarantee if the corruption is C ≤ T a and at most T 1/2+a otherwise; notice that the
case a = 0 corresponds to the best of both worlds. This is done via running the SAPO algorithm
at the level a log(T ) with probability T−a instead of having higher layers. The SAPO algorithm
guarantees that the pseudo-regret caused by any particular arm is at most logarithmic if the instance
is stochastic and at most
√
T if it is adversarial via a beautiful analysis that keeps negative regret of
time intervals that have performed well to avoid testing eliminated arms too often. In our setting, if
12
the corruption level is less than T a, the instance behaves as stochastic causing at most logarithmic
regret. Else the instance is corrupted and we can extrapolate the regret in this layer to the whole
algorithm as arms that are eliminated in this layer are also eliminated before via global eliminations.
Since the regret there is at most
√
T and this is multiplied by T a, this implies a bound of T 1/2+a on
pseudo-regret.
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A Supplementary material on Section 3.1
In this section we provide the proof of Theorem 1. Note that in the lemma statements the width is
defined as in the theorem: wd(a) =
√
log(2KT/δ)
n(a) +
C
n(a) for any arm a 6= a⋆.
Lemma 3.1 (restated) With probability at least 1− δ, arm a⋆ never becomes eliminated.
Proof. The crux of the proof lies in establishing that, with high probability, the upper bound of the
confidence interval of a⋆ never becomes lower than the lower bound of the confidence interval of any
other arm a and therefore a⋆ does not become eliminated.
More formally, let µ˜S(a) and µ˜(a) be the empirical mean after n(a) samples of the stochastic part
of the rewards and the empirical mean after n(a) samples of the corrupted rewards respectively.
Recall that µ(a) is the mean of arm a. By Hoeffding inequality, for any arm a, with probability at
least 1− δ′:
|µ˜S(a)− µ(a)| ≤
√
log(2/δ′)
n(a)
. (1)
We set δ′ = δ/KT to establish that this holds for all arms and all time steps (after arm a has been
played n(a) times). As a result, for any arm a and any time: µ˜S(a) ≤ µ(a) +
√
log(2KT/δ)
n(a) and
µ˜S(a⋆) ≥ µ(a⋆)−
√
log(2KT/δ)
n(a⋆) .
Comparing now the actual (corrupted) empirical means, they can be altered by at most absolute
corruption C. Hence µ˜(a) ≤ µ˜S(a) + Cn(a) and µ˜(a⋆) ≥ µ˜S(a⋆)− Cn(a⋆) .
Combining the above inequalities with the fact that the actual mean of a⋆ is higher than the one of
a, i.e. µ(a⋆) ≥ µ(a), we establish that µ˜(a) − µ˜(a⋆) ≤ wd(a) + wd(a⋆) and therefore arm a⋆ is not
eliminated. Since this holds for all times and arms, the lemma follows.
Lemma 3.2 (restated) With probability at least 1 − δ, all arms a 6= a⋆ become eliminated after
N(a) = 36·log(2KT/δ)+6C
∆(a)2
plays.
Proof. The proof stems from the following observations. By Lemma 3.1, arm a⋆ is with high
probability never eliminated. After N(a) rounds, with high probability, the lower confidence interval
of arm a⋆ is above the upper confidence interval of arm a. This comes from the fact that, after N(a)
plays of arm a (and also of arm a⋆ since it is not eliminated), the empirical stochastic mean of a⋆ is,
with high probability, at most ∆(a)/6 below its actual mean and similarly the empirical stochastic
mean of arm a is at most ∆(a)/6 above its actual mean. Since the corruptions are upper bounded by
C, they can only contribute to a decrease in the average empirical (corrupted) means by at most
∆(a)/6 which is not enough to circumvent the gap ∆(a).
More formally, let µ˜S(a) and µ˜(a) denote the empirical means of the stochastic part of the rewards
and the corrupted rewards respectively after N(a) plays of arm a. By the same Hoeffding inequality
as in the proof of the previous lemma, with probability at least 1− δ, it holds that |µ˜S(a)−µ(a)| ≤√
log(2KT/δ)
N(a) . Therefore, with the same probability, after
36·log(2KT/δ)
∆(a)2
plays for both arm a and a⋆:
µ˜S(a⋆)− µ(a⋆) ≤ ∆(a)6 and µ(a)− µ˜S(a) ≤ ∆(a)6 .
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The absolute corruption is at most C therefore µ˜(a⋆) ≥ µ˜S(a⋆)− CN(a) and µ˜(a) ≤ µ˜S(a)+ CN(a) . By
the choice of N(a), we have CN(a) ≤ ∆(a)6 . Combining with the above argument, this also implies
that the widths are upper bounded by wd(a) ≤ ∆(a)3 and wd(a⋆) ≤ ∆(a)3 .
Combining the above with the fact that the actual mean of a⋆ is ∆(a) higher than the one of a, i.e.
µ(a⋆)− µ(a) = ∆(a), we establish
µ˜(a⋆)− µ˜(a)− wd(a)− wd(a⋆) ≥ µ˜S(a⋆)− µ˜S(a)− 2 · C
N(a)
− wd(a)− wd(a⋆)
> µ(a⋆)− µ(a)− 2 · ∆(a)
6
− ∆(a)
3
− ∆(a)
3
> 0
As a result arm a becomes eliminated after N(a) plays if it is not already eliminated before.
Theorem 1 (restated) If C is a valid upper bound for the total corruption then arm elimination
with wd(a) =
√
log(2KT/δ)
n(a) +
C
n(a) has regret O
(∑
a6=a⋆
(
log(KT/δ)+C
∆(a)
))
with probability 1− δ.
Proof. The proof follows the classical stochastic bandit argument of measuring the regret caused
by each arm a 6= a⋆ as a function of its gap ∆(a) and the number of times N(a) it is played as
established by Lemma 3.2.
For simplicity of presentation, we first provide the pseudo-regret guarantee. Pseudo-regret compares
the expected performance of the algorithm to the expected performance one would have had, had
they selected a⋆ throughout the whole time horizon. The expected performance when one uses a⋆
is µ(a⋆). The loss compared to that every time a 6= a⋆ is used instead is equal to its gap ∆(a).
As a result, the expected contribution to pseudo-regret from suboptimal arm a 6= a⋆ is equal to
N(a) ·∆(a). Lemma 3.2 establishes that with probability 1− δ any suboptimal arm a is played at
most N(a) = 36 log(
2KT/δ)+6C
∆(a)2
times. Each play of the suboptimal arm causes pseudo-regret of ∆(a).
Multiplying the times by the expected regret per time the guarantee (which equals to the gap) and
setting the failure probability δ to be some inverse polynomial of the time horizon T to ensure that
the expected regret due to the bad event is at most a constant leads to the pseudo-regret guarantee.
To turn the above into a high-probability guarantee, we need to show that the regret incurred during
the steps that we pull arm a is not significantly higher than the expectation (therefore bounding the
resulting variance). By the Hoeffding inequality of Lemma 3.1, the empirical cumulative reward of
arm a is, with high probability, at most
√
N(a) log(2KT/δ) less than its expectation. The same holds
for arm a⋆ for these steps (its realized performance is at most this much more than its expectation).
The probability that these statements do not hold for some arm or some time is at most δ.
Regarding arms a 6= a⋆, the√N(a) log(2KT/δ) term can be upper bounded by O(N(a)∆(a)) by the
definition of N(a):
√
N(a) log(2KT/δ) ≤ N(a) ·
√
log(2KT/δ)
N(a)
≤ N(a) ·∆(a)
√
log(2KT/δ)
36 log(2KT/δ) + 6C
≤ N(a)∆(a)
Regarding arm a⋆, let a′ be the arm with the smallest gap. By Lemma 3.1, a⋆ never gets eliminated
but it is not necessarily the ex post optimal arm. In fact some other arm with ∆(a) ≤ √1/T may
be the ex post optimal arm (arms with higher gap are with high probability not the ex post optimal
arm by an analogous argument as in Lemma 3.2. However, by the same argument as above arm a⋆
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is with high probability at most N(a′) ·∆(a′) below its expectation and the ex post optimal arm is
at most this much above its expectation. This gives a bound of N(a′)∆(a′) that is caused by the
case where a⋆ is not the ex post optimal arm.
Therefore the actual regret from times that arm a is played is at most 2N(a)∆(a) where the one
term comes from the expectation and the other from the aforementioned bounds on the variance.
The corruption can increase any cumulative reward by at most C which is already existing in the
regret bound. Replacing N(a) by Lemma 3.2, we obtain the high-probability guarantee. Note
that the failure probabilities of the two lemmas are coupled as they correspond to the same bad
events.
B Supplementary material on Section 3.2
In this section, we provide the proof of Theorem 2. To handle the corruption, we bound with
high probability the total corruption experienced by the slow active arm elimination instance S
(Lemma 3.3). To deal with an adaptive adversary, we need a martingale concentration inequality;
specifically we apply a Bernstein-style inequality introduced in [BLL+11] (Lemma B.1).
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 1 in [BLL+11]). LetX1, . . . ,XT be a sequence of real-valued random numbers.
Assume, for all t, that Xt ≤ R and that E[Xt|X1, . . . ,Xt−1] = 0. Also let
V =
T∑
t=1
E[X2t |X1, . . . ,Xt−1].
Then, for any δ > 0:
P
[
T∑
t=1
Xt > R ln(1/δ) +
e− 2
R
· V
]
≤ δ
Lemma 3.3 (restated) In Algorithm 1, the slow active arm elimination algorithm S observes,
with probability at least 1− δ, corruption of at most ln(1/δ) + 3 during its exploration phase (when
picked with probability 1/C).
Proof. The first observation is that the expected corruption encountered by algorithm S is at most
a constant (total corruption of C encountered with probability 1/C). The rest of the proof focuses
on bounding the variance of this random variable (actual corruption encountered by the layer).
Crucially, since we want to allow the adversary to be adaptive, we should not assume independence
across rounds but only conditional independence (conditioned on the history) and this is why some
more involved concentration inequality is necessary. Therefore we create a martingale sequence
(actual corruption minus expected corruption) and apply a Bernstein-style concentration inequality.
Let Zta be the corruption that is observed by the exploration phase of the algorithm if arm a
is selected. For every round t, if adversary selects corruption Cta then Z
t
a is therefore a random
variable equal to Cta with probability 1/C and 0 otherwise. Given that the adversary is adaptive
and may select the corruptions based on the realizations of the previous rounds, we need to use an
appropriate concentration inequality. We use a Bernstein-style inequality, introduced in [BLL+11]
(Lemma B.1). Initially we resolve the randomness conditioning on ℓ = S (the slow algorithm is
selected). Since active arm elimination is deterministic, conditioned on selecting algorithm S, the
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selected arm is deterministic. Let a(S, t) be the arm that would be selected if ℓ = S (which happens
with probability 1/C). The martingale sequence is now
Xt = Z
t
a(S,t) − E
[
Zta(S,t) | H(1 : t− 1)
]
where H(1 : t) corresponds to the history up to round t. Note that
E
[
X2t |X1, . . . ,Xt−1
]
=
1
C
(
Ca(S,t) −
Ca(S,t)
C
)2
+
C − 1
C
(
Ca(S,t)
C
)2
=
(
Ca(S,t)
)2
C
(
C − 1
C
)2
+
C − 1
C
(
Ca(S,t)
C
)2
≤ 2 · Ca(S,t)
C
.
The last inequality holds as Cta(S,t) ∈ [0, 1] and Ca(S,t) ≤ C by the definition of C.
Therefore, summing over all the rounds,
V =
∑
t
E
[
X2t |X1, . . . ,Xt−1
] ≤∑
t
2
Ca(S,t)
C
≤ 2
C
·
(∑
t
max
a
Cta
)
≤ 2.
A trivial upper bound of |Xt| is R = 1, since the rewards are in [0, 1]. Applying Lemma B.1, we
show that, w.p. 1− δ: ∑
t
Xt ≤ ln(1/δ) + 2(e − 2) ≤ ln(1/δ) + 2
The lemma then follows by adding the expected corruption of E
[∑
t Za(S,t) | H(1 : t− 1)
] ≤ 1 and
therefore obtaining the bound of the statement on the corruption experienced:
∑
t
Zta(S,t) =
∑
t
Xt + E
[∑
t
Za(S,t) | H(1 : t− 1)
]
≤ ln(1/δ) + 3.
Theorem 2 (restated) Algorithm 1 run with widths wdS(a) =
√
log(8KT/δ)
nS(a)
+ 2 log(
8KT/δ)
nS(a)
and
wd
F(a) =
√
log(8KT/δ)
nF(a)
hasO
(∑
a6=a⋆
log(KT/δ)
∆(a)
)
for the stochastic case andO
(
K · C ·∑a6=a⋆ (log(KT/δ))2∆(a) )
for the C-corrupted case with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. For the stochastic case, the bound follows via standard stochastic bandit arguments (similarly
to the proof of Theorem 1 with C = 0) as for each of the two active arm elimination algorithms
we incur, with probability 1 − δℓ,S regret O
(∑
a6=a⋆
(log(2KT/δℓ,S))
∆(a)
)
where δℓ,S = δ/4 is the failure
probability of inequality (1), which governs the results in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, for each of ℓ ∈ {F,S}.
The most interesting case is the C-corrupted setting. Let δS,C = δ/4 be the failure probability in
Lemma 3.3. By Lemma 3.3, with probability at least 1− δS,C , the actual corruption experienced by
the slow active arm elimination algorithm is at most ln(1/δ) + 3 which is less than 2 log(2KT/δ) for
non-trivial values of K and T . Therefore we can apply the analysis of Theorem 1 with corruption
level at least 2 log(2KT/δS,C) and get a handle on the actual regret coming from the slow active arm
elimination algorithm.
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What is left is to bound the regret coming from the fast active arm elimination algorithm. Towards
this goal, we bound the number of times that a suboptimal arm is played in the fast active arm
elimination by the expected time that it remains active at the slow active arm elimination. By
Lemma 3.2, arm a is played in the slow active arm elimination, with probability at least 1− 3δ/4, at
most
NS(a) =
16 log(2KT/δS,S) + 2 log(2KT/δS,C)
∆(a)2
≤ 18 log(8KT/δ)
∆(a)2
.
Having a bound on the number of plays of the arm in the slow active arm elimination instance, we
use this to bound the number of plays in the fast active arm elimination instance. In expectation,
this is at most K · C · NS(a) times as every move in the slow active arm elimination occurs with
probability 1/C and, at least 1/K of these moves are plays of a while it is still active. Since every
time arm a is played it incurs pseudo-regret ∆(a), this provides the pseudo-regret guarantee.
To obtain a high probability guarantee, let δm = δ/4KT and observe that with probability at least
1− δm, we make one move at the slow arm elimination algorithm every O(C log(1/δm)) moves at the
fast arm elimination algorithm. This can be seen by thinking the following process: One tosses coins
with bias p = 1/C until she observes heads for the first time (heads is the p-biased event). After M
tosses of the coins the probability that no heads have arrived is at most (1− p)M . To ensure that
this is less than δm, we need to wait M ≥ log(1/δm)log( 1
1−p
)
, which is achieved by M = log(
1/δm)
p/(1−p) .
By union bound on the failure probabilities for each of those draws, we get that with failure prob-
ability δe = K · NS(a) · δm ≤ δ/4 (since NS(a) ≤ T as it is at most the time horizon), arm a gets
inactivated in F after
NF(a) = K ·NS(a) · C · log(1/δe) = 18 · C ·K · (log(
8KT/δ))2
∆(a)2
.
The last part is to prove that the regret experienced throughout those rounds is not too large. This
follows by the two applications of Hoeffding inequality as before for arms a and a⋆, analogously to
Theorem 1. Combining the above arguments the theorem follows. The total failure probability of
the guarantee is δS,S + δS,C + δF,S + δe ≤ δ.
C Supplementary material on Section 3.3
Theorem 3 (restated) Algorithm 2 which is agnostic to the coruption level C, when run with
widths wdℓ(a) =
√
log(4KT ·log T/δ)
nℓ(a)
+ log(
4KT ·log T/δ)
nℓ(a)
has regret:
O
∑
a6=a∗
K · C log(KT/δ) + log(T )
∆(a)
· log(KT/δ)
.
Proof. The proof follows similar arguments to the proof of Theorem 2. Specifically, for the layers
that are above the corruption level C, by using the standard arguments described in Theorem
1, we establish a
log(2KT/δℓ,S)
∆(a) bound on the regret caused by any suboptimal arm a, with failure
probability δℓ,S = δ/2 log T . Since there are log(T ) such levels, the regret coming from these layers is
upper bounded by the second term of the theorem with failure probabilityδ/2.
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For the layers ℓ that are not tolerant to the corruption, i.e. 2ℓ > C, we apply the same argument
as in the proof of Theorem 2 and bound their regret via the number of plays they are played by the
minimum layer that is robust to corruption ℓ⋆ = argminℓ
[
2ℓ > C
]
. Similarly as in the proof of the
theorem we upper bound the number of plays Nℓ⋆(a) of each suboptimal arm a at this layer (by
exactly the same arguments), then bound the number of plays in the suboptimal layer via the same
coin toss process as in that proof and, last bound the regret they incur during this part. Since we
do not know the amount of corruption in advance (and this amount is adaptively selected), we also
need to take a union bound on the number of layers so that the guarantee on Nℓ⋆(a) holds for all
layers simulataneously if they end up being correct; we therefore repeat the arguments in Theorem
2 with δℓ,C = δ/2 log T and δm ≤ δ/2KT log T .
Last, we note that, since we used powers of 2 to increase the corruption among layers, the fact that
we did not apply the arguments of Theorem 2 with the exact C but instead used a C ′ such that
C < C ′ < 2C causes just an extra constant factor on the regret.
D Supplementary material on Section 4
Theorem 4 (restated) Consider a multi-armed bandits algorithm that has the property that for
any stochastic input in the two arm setting, it has pseudo-regret bounded by c log(T )/∆, where
∆ = |µ1 − µ2|. For any ǫ, ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1), there is a corruption level C with T ǫ < C < T ǫ′ and a
C-corrupted instance such that with constant probability the regret is Ω(C).
Proof. The proof follows a sequence of steps.
Step 1: Analyze behavior in the stochastic case. Fix a constant ∆ ≤ 1/6 and observe how the
algorithm behaves for the stochastic input that has Bernoulli arms of means (µ1, µ2) = (12 −∆, 12).
Since in that setting the expected regret is the same as ∆ ·E[T1] where T1 is the number of pulls of
arm 1, it follows that E[T1] ≤ c log(T )/∆2.
Step 2: find a large interval that is hit with at most constant probability. We divide the
space between T ǫ and T ǫ
′
into O(log(T )/(ǫ′− ǫ)) intervals Ii = [3i−1T ǫ, 3iT ǫ) such that size of each
interval is twice the size of all the previous intervals combined. For each interval i, let T1,i be the
number of times that arm 1 is pulled in the i-th interval. Then, there exists an interval Ii = [C, 3C)
such that E[T1,i] ≤ c˜ := O(1/[(ǫ′ − ǫ)∆2]).
Step 3: create an adversary that forces a lot of regret in interval i. The adversary is quite
simple: for the first C steps, the arms are Bernoulli with means (12 −∆, 12) and for the remaining
timesteps, the arms are Bernoulli with means (12 +∆,
1
2).
We use E and P to refer to the probability law whe inputs are drawn with respect to (12 −∆, 12) in
all timesteps and E′ and P′ to refer to the probability law when the input is according to (12 −∆, 12)
in the first K steps and according to (12 +∆,
1
2 ) onwards.
Step 4: With constant probability arm 1 is pulled a constant number of times in Ii
under both P and P′. Under the probability law P, this follows directly from Markov’s inequality:
c˜ = E[T1,i] ≥ 2c˜P[T1,i ≥ 2c˜], so: P[T1,i ≤ 2c˜] ≥ 12 .
Denote by A the event that T1,i ≤ 2c˜. We want to argue that P′[A] is also constant. In order to
do that, let Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Z2c˜) be a vector storing in Zs the reward of arm 1 in the s-th time
it is pulled in interval Ii. Notice that in both the stochastic and corrupted scenarios if the learner
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observes the same values of Z she acts the exact same way. Therefore, if we condition on Z, the
probability that she ends up pulling arm 1 for more than 2c˜ times is exactly the same. In other
words:
P[A|Z] = P′[A|Z]
Therefore:
P
′[A] =
∑
z
P
′[Z = z] · P[A|Z = z] ≥
(
1
2 −∆
1
2 +∆
)2c˜
P
′[Z = z]P[A|Z = z] ≥ 1
2
·
(
1
2 −∆
1
2 +∆
)2c˜
which is a constant.
Step 5: concentration bounds for the regret incurred in each interval. We now define an
event B that occurs with probability 1 − o(1) that captures all the concentration bounds we need
for the proof. First, we require arm 1 to be the optimal arm. Let rt(i) be the reward of arm i in
time step t. We know that E′[
∑
t r
t(1)] = 12T + ∆(T − 2C) and E′[
∑
t r
t(2)] = 12T . Since all the
rewards are independent we can use the Hoeffding bound to bound the probability P′(
∑
t∆t < 0)
where ∆t = rt(2)− rt(1):
P
′
(∑
t
rt(1) <
∑
t
rt(2)
)
≤ P′
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
t
∆t − E′∆t
∣∣∣∣∣ > ∆(T − 2C)
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−T∆
2
2
(
1− 2C
T
))
= o(1)
Now we establish some concentration on the regret that the learner achieves with respect to arm 1
in the intervals [1, C), [C, 3C) and [3C, T ). We note that if the learner pulls arm 1, she does not
incur any regret. If she pulls arm 2, she incurs regret ∆t = rt(2) − rt(1) which can be positive or
negative. To compute regret with respect to arm 1 in each of those intervals, we sample ∆t every
time that the arm 2 is pulled.
Step 5a: interval [1, C). In this interval, E′∆t = −∆, so
∑
t∈[1,C)∆t = −C∆. If Y is the number
of times arm 1 is pulled, then the regret is given by
∑Y
s=1∆s where in the previous expression we
abuse notation and mean by ∆s the regret in the s-th time the arm 2 is pulled instead of the regret
in the t-th period. Therefore:
P
′
(
Y∑
s=1
∆s < −1.1∆C
)
≤ P′
(
min
t≤C
t∑
s=1
∆s < −1.1∆C
)
≤
C∑
t=1
P
′
(
t∑
s=1
∆s < −1.1∆C
)
We then use the Hoeffding bound in the last expression and get:
C∑
t=1
2 exp
(
−1
2
t
(
1.1∆C −∆t
t
)2)
≤ C · exp
(
−1
2
(0.1∆C)2
)
= o(1)
Step 5b: interval [C, 3C). In this interval, E′∆t = ∆, so using the same bound as before, we get
P
′
 ∑
t∈[C,3C)
∆t < 1.9∆C
 ≤ 2 exp (−C(0.1∆)2) = o(1)
Step 5c: interval [3C, T ] In this interval, pulling arm 2 has again positive expected regret. We
use the same technique used in 5a to argue that she cannot obtain large negative regret with high
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probability: Let Y be the number of times arm 2 is pulled in that interval and again we abuse
notation and let ∆s be the difference in rewards in the s-th time the arm is pulled. Then:
P
′
(
Y∑
s=1
∆t < − log T
)
≤ P′
(
min
t≤T
t∑
s=1
∆t < − log T
)
≤
T∑
t=1
P
′
(
t∑
s=1
∆t < − log T
)
For t = 1.. log T this probability is zero, since ∆t ≥ −1. Now, for larger T , we can use the standard
Chernoff bound:
T∑
t=log T
P
′
(
t∑
s=1
∆t < − log T
)
≤ 2T exp
(
−1
2
log2(T )∆
)
= o(1)
Now all the concentration bounds have been established we define the event B to be the event where
all those concentration bounds hold. More precisely, B is the event where the following four things
happen: (a) empirically arm 1 is better than arm 2; (b) in interval [1, C), the regret of the learner
is at least −1.1∆C; (c) in interval [C, 3C), the difference between the total rewards of both arms
is at least 1.9∆C; and (d) the regret of the learer in interval [3C, T ] is at least − log T . By the
discussion in step 5, we know that P′(B) = 1− o(1).
Step 6: putting it all together. Since P′(A) = Ω(1) and P′(B) = 1 − o(1), then by the union
bound, P′(A and B) ≥ P′(A)−o(1) = Ω(1). Now, we need to argue that in the constant probability
event (A and B), the regret of the learner is at least Ω(C).
We simply sum the regret of the learner in each of the intervals. For intervals [1, C) and [3C, T ]
we can use the bounds computed in steps 5a andn 5c directly. For interval [C, 3C), we note that
conditioned on A, the learner probes arm 1 a constant number of times, so his total regret differs
from the regret by pulling arm 2 in all iterations by at most a constant, therefore the total regret
can be bounded by:
−1.1∆C + (1.9∆C − 4c˜)− log(T ) = Ω(∆C)
We can adapt the argument to provide a bound on the expected positive regret E[Reg+] where
x+ = max{x, 0}. Note that the high probability bounds provided also imply a bound on the ex-
pected positive regret.
Theorem 5. If a multi-armed bandits algorithm that has the property that for any stochastic
input in the two arm setting, it has pseudo-regret bounded by c log1+α(T )/∆ for α < 1. For any
ǫ, ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1), there is a corruption level C with T ǫ < C < T ǫ′ and a C-corrupted instance such that
E[Reg+] = Ω(T ǫ−δ) for all δ > 0.
Proof. Modify the proof of Theorem 4 as follows. Define c˜ = O(logα(T )/[(ǫ′ − ǫ)∆2]) and again
select an interval such that E[Ti,1] ≤ c˜. Event A is defined in the same way. By Markov’s inequality:
P[A] ≥ 1/2 and
P
′[A] ≥ 1
2
·
(
1
2 −∆
1
2 +∆
)2c˜
= exp(−O(logα(T )))
Step 5 remains unchanged and in step 6 note that P′(B) ≪ P′(A) since α < 1, so P′(A and B) =
exp(−O(logα(T ))). Therefore, with probability at least exp(−O(logα(T ))) the regret is at least
Ω(C) = Ω(T ǫ) and therefore, E[Reg+] = Ω(T ǫ · exp(−O(logα(T )))) = Ω(T ǫ−δ) for all δ > 0.
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